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Abstract 
 
In this paper I explore Karl Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’, focusing on its 
presuppositions and implications as a form of realism regarding the nature of 
scientific truth.  I seek to reveal an underlying tension in Popper’s thought pertaining 
to his account of basic statements and the related question of whether the falsification 
of a universal theory can ever justifiably be regarded as final or conclusive. I conclude 
that Popper’s account of basic statements is implicitly conventionalist, and that it 
should, in consistency, have forced him in the direction of Quinean holism. 
 
 
1. The nature of science 
 
Popper’s main enterprise was to construct a model of scientific 
rationality which embodied an account of the logical relationships that 
obtain between theoretical and observation statements in science, and, 
associated with this, a prescriptive methodology. He was an 
epistemological fallibilist who recognized that the ‘central problem of 
epistemology has always been and still is the growth of knowledge’, but 
who held that the growth of knowledge ‘can be studied best by studying the 
growth of scientific knowledge’.1 Consequently, his concern with the problem 
of demarcation in philosophy of science was intended to be seen as 
having the most wide-ranging philosophical implications, since he 
proposed that epistemology ‘should be identified with the theory of 
scientific method’.2 He described how the issue of demarcation relates to 
his own general objectives as follows:  
 
[My] business, as I see it, is not to bring about the 
overthrow of metaphysics. It is, rather, to formulate a 
suitable characterization of empirical science, or to 
define the concepts ‘empirical science’ and 
‘metaphysics’ in such a way that we shall be able to say 
of a given system of statements whether or not its 
closer study is the concern of empirical science.3  
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Demarcation, then, is the problem of distinguishing the empirical sciences 
from non-empirical areas such as logic, pure mathematics, and 
metaphysics, as well as ‘pseudo-sciences’ such as astrology and 
phrenology. Popper’s approach to formulating a criterion of demarcation 
was non-naturalistic or prescriptive, the offering of ‘a proposal for an 
agreement or convention’.4 For him, the line between science and 
metaphysics was to be drawn by agreement and decision, not by 
discovery. Such an agreement, however, must be informed by both logical 
and methodological considerations, and while he acknowledged that ‘a 
reasonable discussion of these questions is only possible between parties 
having some purpose in common’,5 he was optimistic about the 
possibility of rational assent on the part of those who share his goal of 
adequately characterizing empirical science.   
 
Popper rejected the naturalistic approach to the problem of 
demarcation taken by the logical positivists, and counter-pointed that 
with his repudiation of their view that science is characterized by its 
inductive methods, in which universal laws are supposedly inferred from 
a set of singular statements such as experimental observation-reports. 
This is the traditional observationalist-inductivist paradigm of scientific 
investigation, the repudiation of which links the problems of induction 
and of demarcation in Popper’s philosophy. His case against it rests upon 
three central contentions. First, there are no ‘pure’ or theory-free 
observations. ‘Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a 
definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem’.6 As such, it is 
theory-laden, and involves the application of theoretical terms, a 
descriptive language and a conceptual scheme to particular experiential 
situations. Second, scientific laws are strictly unverifiable. All such 
theories are universal in nature, and no finite collection of observation 
statements, however great, is logically equivalent to, or can justify, an 
unrestricted universal proposition. Third, induction, conceived of as a 
system of logical inferences which generates scientific law from the 
particularity of experimental results, is ‘a myth’.7 Such inferences, Popper 
held, play no role in scientific investigation or in human life generally.   
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At one level, then, Popper concurred with Hume’s critique of 
induction. However, the crucial counterpart of the latter, which he 
believed Hume himself had missed, is that while no number of positive 
outcomes at the level of experimental testing can demonstrate the truth 
of a scientific theory, a single genuine counter-instance is logically 
decisive. ‘Hume showed that it is not possible to infer a theory from 
observation statements; but this does not affect the possibility of refuting 
a theory by observation statements’.8 By the canonical modus tollens rule of 
classical logic, it is possible to deductively infer the falsity of a universal 
proposition once the truth-value of an appropriately related singular 
proposition is established. For Popper, this means that the only kind of 
inferences involved in science are deductive ones, from observation-
reports to the falsity of the corresponding universal hypotheses, and 
inferences occur not in the generation, but in the critical testing, of such 
hypotheses.  
 
Accordingly, Popper’s view of the relationship between scientific 
theory and experience was both anti-inductivist and anti-Humean: theory 
is not logically derived from, nor can it be confirmed by, experience, 
though experience can and does delimit it. He argued that human 
knowledge generally, including scientific theory as one of its most refined 
forms, is both fallible and wholly hypothetical, and is produced, not by 
logical inference, but by the creative imagination. The central rational 
activity in science is that of problem-solving, whereby new hypotheses are 
imaginatively projected to solve problems which have arisen with respect 
to a pre-existing theoretical framework, a process which may be 
retrospectively retraced though ‘more and more primitive theories and 
myths … [to] unconscious, inborn expectations’.9 The critical role of 
experience in science is to show us which theories are false, not which 
theories are true. However, a theory that has successfully withstood 
critical testing is thereby ‘corroborated’, and may be regarded as being 
preferable to falsified rivals. In the case of rival non-falsified theories, for 
Popper, the higher the informative content of a theory the better it is 
scientifically, because every gain in content brings with it a commensurate 
gain in predictive scope and testability. For that very reason, he 
propounded the view that a good scientific theory will be more improbable 
than its rivals, because the probability and informative content of a theory 
vary inversely: ‘If our aim is the advancement or growth of knowledge, 
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then a high probability (in the sense of calculus of probability) cannot 
possibly be our aim as well: these two aims are incompatible’.10 
 
Popper’s perception of the asymmetrical logical relation which 
exists between verification and falsification, it is thus not too much to say, 
lies at the heart of his philosophy of science: a universal scientific theory 
cannot, in principle, be verified, but a single counter-instance can and 
does decisively falsify it. Accordingly, he held that, from a logical 
perspective, a system of theories is scientific only if it is refutable or 
falsifiable: 
 
I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be 
capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a 
positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form 
shall be such that can be singled out, by means of 
empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for 
an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.11  
 
This demarcation criterion was most clearly defined by Popper in terms 
of the relation that holds between a scientific theory and ‘basic 
statements’, where the latter are to be understood as singular existential 
observation-reports of the form ‘There is an X at Y’. On this definition, 
where a theory is scientific, it must exhaustively divide the class of basic 
statements into two non-empty subclasses. These are (1) the class of basic 
statements that are consistent with the theory, or which the theory 
‘permits’; and (2) the class of basic statements that the theory ‘prohibits’ 
or rules out. The latter class—which, in Popperian terms, is by far the 
more important of the two—is the theory’s potential falsifiers, since the 
truth of any one of them implies the falsity of the theory. In short, for 
Popper, ‘a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers is not 
empty’.12  
 
 
2. Logical and methodological falsificationism 
 
Popper was aware that there is a significant disparity between 
precision of the logical analysis of statements contained in his 
demarcation criterion and the complex, heterogeneous nature of actual 
scientific practice. Since observation is, as he insisted, itself fallible, it is 
always possible to question an experimental result. His account of the 
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logic of falsifiability was thus tempered by an explicit recognition that 
scientific theories are often retained in the face of conflicting or 
anomalous empirical evidence, and that, in actual scientific practice, a 
single conflicting or counter-instance is never sufficient to force the 
repudiation of an established theory. He was also cognizant of the fact 
that, against dogmatic or uncritical advocacy, ‘no conclusive disproof of a 
theory can ever be produced’.13 In short, he recognized that a logical 
analysis of statements alone is not sufficient to recapitulate the unique 
character of empirical science.  
 
To achieve that objective, Popper concluded, it is necessary to 
embed falsifiability in a normative methodology, which, in this 
connection, relates to decisions which must be made as to how to deal 
with scientific statements, which in turn are determined by our aims. For 
Popper, the aims of elucidating empirical science and constructing a 
model of scientific rationality bring with them the need to adopt a set of 
rules that will ‘ensure the testability of scientific statements; which is to 
say, their falsifiability’.14 Accordingly, the ‘supreme rule’ associated with 
the falsifiability criterion, which functions as a norm with which all other 
methodological rules must accord, is ‘the rule which says that the other 
rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that they do 
not protect any statement in science against falsification’.15 This rule 
prohibits, as unscientific, ad hoc reformulation of theory to meet 
contradictory evidence. The recognition of the hypothetical and fallible 
nature of human knowledge, and, with this recognition, the willingness to 
subject even one’s most cherished theory to a critical test which could 
conceivably show it to be false became, for him, the defining 
characteristic of the true scientific mentality:  
 
The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving 
to be right; for it is not his possession of knowledge, of 
irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but 
his persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth.16  
 
 
3. The Quine-Duhem Thesis and holism 
 
Quine (1953), following Pierre Duhem, and Lakatos (1970) have 
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both attacked the key Popperian notion that the falsification of scientific 
theories can be yielded by discrete critical tests, arguing strongly for 
holistic conclusions against it. Quine, who called into question the 
assumption of a clear-cut distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements as one of the two key ‘dogmas of empiricism’, also vigorously 
advocated a holistic view of empirical testing, contending that ‘our 
statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not 
individually but only as a corporate body’.17 On this view, the entire 
system of human knowledge impinges upon experience ‘only along the 
edges’,18 hence contradictory empirical evidence has no necessary 
connection with any given theory, and may in fact force a re-assessment 
of a range of elements within the system. For Quine, scientific theories 
are underdetermined by physical evidence, i.e., no physical observation can 
ever decide between two theories, because each theory can be revised to 
accommodate the new evidence by adding new auxiliary hypotheses. For 
this Reason, The Q-D Thesis is sometimes called ‘the 
Underdetermination Thesis’.   
 
In a similar vein, Lakatos argued that many of the most respected 
scientific theories cannot be refuted by individual critical tests, as they are 
not in themselves prohibitive, but rather ‘forbid an event occurring in some 
specified finite spatio-temporal region… only on the condition that no other factor … 
has any influence on it’.19 Such theories, in other words, require the addition 
of an implicit ceteris paribus clause if they are to have prohibitive 
implications at all, and the ceteris paribus clause can always be replaced by 
another to make the theory consistent with apparently falsifying evidence. 
Hence theories are not falsified in isolation, Lakatos contended, but as 
integral elements of a ‘degenerating research programme’ which is 
supplanted by a rival programme possessing equal predictive success and 
additional ‘heuristic power’.20 
 
Popper’s response to these and related criticisms was to emphasize 
the significance of assumed background knowledge in the encounter 
between theory and experimental results, acknowledging that such 
assumed knowledge is fully as open to challenge and revision as the 
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theory which its tentative acceptance permits us to test. He argued, 
however, that such considerations do not entail holistic conclusions, as in 
many cases it is quite possible to determine which hypothesis or group of 
hypotheses ‘is responsible for the refutation’.21  
 
4. Basic statements and conventionalism 
 
While this reply appears plausible, I wish in conclusion to argue 
that Popper’s account of basic statements should have forced him in the 
direction of holism. Popper follows Kant in repudiating the 
positivist/empiricist view that basic statements are infallible, and argues 
instead that such basic statements are not mere ‘reports’ of passively 
registered sensations. Rather they are descriptions of what is observed as 
interpreted by the observer with reference to a determinate theoretical 
framework. This is why Popper repeatedly emphasises that basic 
statements are not infallible, and it indicates what he means when he says 
that they are ‘theory laden’—perception itself is an active process, in 
which the mind assimilates data by reference to an assumed theoretical 
backdrop. He accordingly asserts that basic statements themselves are 
open-ended hypotheses: they have a certain causal relationship with 
experience, but they are not determined by experience, and they cannot be 
confirmed by experience.   
 
This is extremely important, as it differentiates Popper’s position 
from that of the logical empiricists (Russell and the early Wittgenstein) 
and of a number of the logical positivists, such as Schlick, Neurath and 
Carnap (with whose positions Popper’s was and is sometimes confused), 
all of whom advocated, in one way or another, that what were variously 
termed ‘basic’, ‘simple’, ‘elementary’ or ‘protocol’ statements are the 
ultimate and incorrigible verifiers of scientific theory.  
 
However, this poses a difficulty regarding the consistency of 
Popper’s theory: Methodologically, in order to actually test a scientific 
theory it must be possible to determine whether or not the basic 
propositions which would, if true, falsify it, are actually true or false (i.e. 
whether its potential falsifiers are actual falsifiers). But how can this be 
known, if such basic statements cannot be verified by experience? The 
nature of this difficulty can be illustrated by reference to the logical 
considerations underlying Popper’s account of demarcation. In 
prescribing his falsificationist methodology, Popper’s construal of the 
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logic of testing is on the model of the modus tollens inference, which—
assuming the existential import of a universal theory—is as follows: 
 
If theory A is true, then X (a singular proposition) is true. 
And X is false 
Therefore, theory A is false. 
 
Hence Popper’s claim that our starting point has to be the recognition 
that, whereas we can never, even in principle, establish a universal 
statement to be true, we can, in principle, establish it to be false.  
 
Given that the problem of confirmation/justification/falsification 
originates in the recognition that universal laws or statements of science 
are not themselves confirmable (i.e. that we cannot know that a universal 
theory is or is not true), methodologically the focus necessarily shifts to 
the singular propositions which constitute what Popper terms its 
‘potential falsifiers’. How can we know whether these are true/false, and 
thus put them to work in the testing of universal statements? Oddly (or 
perhaps ironically) enough, this is not a question which would have 
caused a Hume or a Schlick a moment’s hesitation, since on their analysis 
basic propositions are reports of direct experience, and as such are 
impervious to error. It is precisely Popper’s (in my view, justified) 
rejection of such crude empiricism that rules out such an answer for him, 
and throws up again the crucial methodological question as to how basic 
statements can be known. In terms of the (oversimplified) modus tollens 
construction given above, how, if ever, can we know that ‘X is false’? His 
answer is that we cannot: ‘basic statements are not justifiable by our 
immediate experiences, but are .... accepted by an act, a free decision’.22  
 
This seems to be a sophisticated form of conventionalism—the 
only condition for the acceptance of a ‘contradictory’ basic statement is 
that it should simultaneously corroborate a falsifying hypothesis: ‘‘If 
accepted basic statements contradict a theory, then we take them as 
providing sufficient grounds for its falsification only if they corroborate a 
falsifying hypothesis at the same time’.23 Corroboration, however, is 
invariably provisional, open-ended and revisable, which entails that 
falsification can never be conclusive. This is a conclusion which he 
sometimes affirms:  
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It is impossible ... that any theoretical system should 
ever be conclusively falsified;24 
 
No conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be 
produced;25 
  
…we may have made a mistake when we accepted the 
singular statement ... and, for this reason, the 
falsification of the theory is not ‘absolutely certain’.26 
 
But it is a conclusion which he also frequently also denies:  
 
Every time we succeed in falsifying a theory …27 
 
If we renounce this requirement [verifiability] and 
admit as empirical also statements which are decidable 
in one sense only—unilaterally decidable, and more 
especially, falsifiable … the contradiction disappears.28 
 
However, it is the suggestion alone that theoretical falsification can 
sometimes be conclusive and final, and be known to be conclusive and 
final, that has given Popperian falsificationism its longstanding appeal, 
and has separated it from the ‘underdeterminationism’ of those who, like 
Quine and Lakatos, have argued for holistic conclusions. There is also a 
question as to whether it is methodologically sounder to accept, on the 
basis of a free decision, the falsity of a basic proposition in order to infer 
the falsification of a universal law rather than to accept directly, on the 
basis of a free decision, the universal law itself? No doubt, answers in the 
affirmative may suggest themselves in terms of decision-theory and the 
rationality of pragmatic choice, and I do not wish do be understood as 
dismissing these a priori. But it seems very difficult to reconcile this with 
Popper’s view that science progressively moves closer to the truth, 
conceived of in terms of the correspondence theory, and more difficult 
still to see how Popper can thereby resist holism (this might explain the 
relative weakness of his responses to Quine, Lakatos and Putnam in the 
Schilpp volume).  
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Bluntly stated, either Popper retains his account of basic 
statements and is forced to accept pragmatic holism of a form advocated 
by Quine or Lakatos, or he retains his opposition to holism by 
abandoning his account of basic statements. He cannot, in my view, 
consistently retain both.29 
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